[latest version here][Appendix][CEPR DP][CSEF WP][MoFiR WP]
Abstract
Presentations: 10th CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions*, EEA Congress 2025, CEPR-IMO Workshop (Bocconi), CEPR Governance in a Polarized World (POLECONFIN), EBRD Office of the Chief Economist Seminar, CEPR Symposium, Working Group in African Political Economy; 8th EBRD-CEPR Research Symposium: The Frontiers of finance in emerging markets; Groningen internal seminar; SIOE 2026 Conference. (* if by coauthor)
Abstract: How do organizations adapt internally when ethnic divisions intensify? We develop a model in which a bank jointly chooses the ethnicity of its branch manager and how much lending authority to delegate. Managers who share local borrowers' ethnicity acquire better information about them but are also more prone to favor them at the bank's expense. Conflict changes the relative importance of these two frictions, shaping both optimal managerial appointments and delegation. We test the model using a new panel of 979 Ethiopian bank branches surveyed before and after the onset of the 2020 civil war, exploiting variation in banks' exposure to ethnic conflict across their branch networks as a source of plausibly exogenous variation. Where the bank's and city's ethnicities differ, a one-standard-deviation increase in exposure raises the probability of appointing a manager sharing the city's predominant ethnicity by 6.7 percentage points, or 36 percent, while reducing delegated lending authority. Conflict-exposed branches are also more likely to be staffed by experienced insiders reassigned within the bank. We use an LLM-based CEO vignette exercise to further examine the underlying mechanisms.

